Legal Personhood and Moral Agency: A Philosophical Analysis of Rights, Duties, and Identity

Abstract

Legal personhood has long been pegged on the idea of human rationality and moral agency. But over the past decades, it has been applied to corporations, artificial intelligence, and even aspects of nature, provoking essential philosophical and ethical dilemmas. The given research paper presents the thorough philosophical examination of the issue of legal personhood through its inherent relation to moral agency, identity, rights, and responsibilities. Using conceptual analysis, comparative legal analysis, and normative ethical analysis, the paper explores the question of whether the entities which are incapable of self-awareness, conscience, or moral reasoning can coherently have a legal status and be responsible. The study finds that there are huge disparities even in the existing legal practices wherein instrumental legal nomenclatures tend to overlook the underlying ethical premises. It contends that legal personhood should be redefined on principled basis; that which is consistent with coherent moral agency and a fixed sense of identity. The paper also captures the concerns of the impact of the emerging technologies and artificial entities on the future law. Finally, the paper will be of contribution to the interdisciplinary discourse that is increasing between law, philosophy, and ethics and will suggest a more ethics-based approach to allocating legal rights and duties.